For a large class of additive random utility discrete choice models with income effects, we compute the probability distribution of the compensating variation. We show that the cumulative distribution function only depends on the choice probabilities. Our results are used to compute the distribution of equivalent variation. The moments of the compensating variation are a onedimensional integral of the choice probabilities. Using the expected compensating variation, we extend Shephard's Lemma to the probabilistic demand systems. Both conditional and unconditional (on the individual choice) distributions of compensating variation are considered.
Introduction
Discrete choice models (DCM) have traditionally been used as disaggregate demand models. The first application of DCM was in Transportation, to describe mode choice (choice between public and private mode). Daniel McFadden, a leader in this field, published his earlier and seminal work on DCM in the transportation context (see Domencich and McFadden [6] ). At the very beginning of the study of disaggregate demand models, researchers were interested in the computation of welfare measures, since those models were (and are still) mainly used for policy analysis. McFadden [9] provides an exact (deterministic) welfare measure when the marginal utility of money is constant (see also Small and Rosen [17] ). In the original formulation, the distribution of the surpluses was not treated nor were the distribution of the compensations, even with no income effect. However, the basic idea of DCM is that individuals are not identical and have probabilistic choice behavior so that the distribution of the welfare measure that is computed in this paper matters.
The focus of the paper is the derivation of the stochastic Hicksian welfare measure in DCM. This is not a new topic. Currently, welfare measures with income effect are studied via numerical simulations. McFadden [11] , has developed a sampler for computing compensating variation (CV) caused by a change in the consumer environment. He has also provided an algorithm (the GEV sampler) to estimate welfare effects for the class of generalized extreme value (GEV) models. However, even though the sampler leads to consistent results, it is time consuming since a large number of iterations must be performed in order to obtain numerical approximations of the true welfare impact, with a reasonable level of accuracy.
New econometric techniques have been developed by Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes [3] and applied to estimate a mixed logit demand as well as costs parameters for the U.S. car industry. Berry et al. [4] analyze the welfare effects of the voluntary export restraints placed on Japanese cars in 1981 by using simulation techniques (similar to McFadden's GEV sampler). However, virtually no theoretical work has been performed to analyze policies in the presence of income effects in oligopoly models of imperfect competition.
DCM have became increasingly popular in industrial organization over the last decade to describe consumers making choices of differentiated products (see Anderson, de Palma and Thisse [2] and McFadden [12] ). They provide flexible tools for the study of imperfect competition since the existence of a price Nash equilibrium is guaranteed for log-concave taste distributions (see Caplin and Nalebuff [5] ). These advances have been used for the study of imperfect competition. 3 However, these theoretical studies ignore so far income effects. One reason is that there exists no exact formula to perform welfare analysis with income effects. We expect that the derivation of exact welfare formulas for DCM with income effect opens a door to a whole set of new research, both for theoretical and empirical studies in industrial organization.
In this paper, we compute analytically the probability distribution of CV for additive random utility DCM. In Section 2, assumptions on the indirect utility and on the distribution of preferences are made. We also present the definition of the individual CV. In Section 3, Theorem 1 provides the probability distribution of the CV. In Theorem 2, the distribution of the equivalent variation is also derived. In Section 4, we use Theorem 1 to compute the moments of the CV, which are given up to a one-dimensional integral of the choice probabilities. We also introduce a version of the Shephard's Lemma for DCM. We verify that with no income effects, expected CV coincide with the traditional variation of surplus. Section 5 concludes.
Assumptions and definitions
In this section we introduce the DCM framework and define the conditional (and unconditional) CV.
Discrete choice models
We consider a consumer selecting one good in the finite choice set A = {1, ..., n}.
Her conditional utility u i from purchasing good i is assumed to be additively separable in two components
The first term, v i , is the observed (by the modeler) component and the second term, ² i , is the unobserved component. We denote hereafter by v ≡ (v 1 , ..., v n ) the vector of the observed components of the utility.
It is assumed that v i depends on the consumer disposable income y i (after the purchase of good i), on a vector χ i including other observable attributes (such as price p i , quality, location, etc.) and parameters to be estimated:
We assume that:
A1 (Indirect utility function) V (.) is a continuous indirect utility function.
In particular, it is strictly increasing in income (see, e.g. Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green [8] ).
Due to lack of information, the modeler can at best describe the unobserved components of the utility ² ≡ (² 1 , ..., ² n ) as realizations of a random vector denoted by e ² ≡ (e ² 1 , ...,e ² n ). We further assume that:
A2 (Random components) e ² is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure over R n and has a convex support B ⊂ R n .
In standard DCM, the consumer purchases the good with the highest conditional utility u i . The event B i (v) whereby good i yields maximum utility is the set of unobserved components ² which satisfy
Note that B i (v), i ∈ A, are convex subsets of B which form almost everywhere (a.e.) a partition 4 of B. Therefore, the probability that the consumer selects 4 Since the event that a consumer is indifferent between two (or more) goods occurs with zero probability, according to A2.
good i which is given by
, can be written as 
Compensating variation in discrete choice models
We wish to compute the compensating variation for a change The corresponding CV for the consumer who is constrained to select alternative i is defined as the income adjustment, denoted by ψ i , that equates the utility at situation 0 and 1. It solves the implicit equation
Note that ² i is dropped from Eq. (4) given the additive structure of the model 5 Alternatively, ² may be redrawn (from the same distribution) after the change. The invariance of the ² 0 s is widely accepted and therefore treated in this paper. 6 In some microeconomic textbooks, an alternative definition for the CV is used:
We adopt the same convention here as in McFadden [11] .
(see Eq. (1)). We assume regularity condition on V (.) such that:
Since V (.) is strictly increasing in income (see A1), ψ i is unique. Below, we shall use the notations ψ − ≡ min k∈A ψ k and ψ + ≡ max k∈A ψ k .
Consider now the case where the consumer is allowed to modify his choice after the change and after compensation. If at situation 1, an (arbitrary) income adjustment of z is operated, the maximum utility of the consumer is:
Definition 1 (Conditional CV)
The conditional CV for a consumer selecting good i at situation 0 is the income adjustment cv i (²) that equates maximum utility at situation 1 to utility of good i chosen at situation 0:
Let cv (²) denote the unconditional CV:
Definition 2 (Unconditional CV) The unconditional CV is the income adjustment cv (²) that equates maximum utility at situation 1 to maximum utility at situation 0:
7 The conditional CV also depends on y 0 i , χ 0 i , and on
For simplicity, these arguments are dropped.
Note that the unconditional CV is used if the choice of the consumer is not observed by the modeler.
Distribution of compensating variation
in this section, we introduce an exact formula for the distribution of the (un)conditional CV. Since the vector ² is not observed, cv i (²) and cv (²) are the realizations of random variables which are denoted by e cv i and e cv, respectively. In Theorem 1, we provide the (un)conditional probability distribution of the compensations.
Preliminary results
We first consider two lemmata and provide a geometric illustration for the main result of the paper for the 3-goods case. In Lemma 1, we show that cv i (²) exists and we provide bounds which depends on the initial choice (i) and on the final
is a.e. uniquely defined by
We have (see proof in Appendix):
Lemma 1 (Existence of CV and transitions) Assume A1-A3 hold. For a consumer selecting good i ∈ A at situation 0, cv i (²) exists, is unique and
As a consequence of Lemma 1, for each ² ∈ B, cv (²) exists, is unique and
Lemma 1 can be explained intuitively as follows. Consider a consumer selecting good i at situation 0. First, if she selects again good i at situation 1 (once the income adjustment takes place), she needs necessarily an income adjustment of ψ i (see Eq. (4)). Conversely, if she receives an income adjustment of ψ i , she cannot shift to a different good since by doing so she would derive a greater utility than her achieved utility at situation 0. Hence ψ i is the smallest income adjustment. Second, if she shifts towards a good k 6 = i, an income adjustment of ψ k will restore the utility of good k to its level at situation 0. Moreover, she would derive a lower utility than initially since good i was preferred to k.
Therefore, the income adjustment must be lower than ψ k . Lemma 1 implies that with appropriate ranking of the goods, the transition probability matrix is triangular.
Lemma 2 characterizes the set of consumers who initially choose i and require a compensation lower than a given amount z. This lemma provides an expression for C i (z), the event that a consumer receives a CV lower or equal to z and selects good i before the change
We show that C i (z) can be written in a form similar to (2), i.e. as a choice event in a DCM. Lemma 2 plays a central role in the computation of the c.d.f.
of e cv i . We have:
Lemma 2 (Choice event and CV) Assume A1-A3 hold. The event C i (z), i ∈ A, can be written as:
where v * (z) the n-vector with kth component, k ∈ A, is given by:
Conversely, assume that v
, we obtain:
so that cv i (²) ≤ z. Henceforth:
¢¤ and using the fact that
we can rewrite the above expression as follows:
coincide. Consequently, using Eq. (12), Eq. (10) is obtained.
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is illustrated by Figures 1-3 for the 3-goods case. Consumers are located in a two-dimensional space and described by the
In Figure 1 , the consumer located at S 0 is indifferent among the three goods.
The half line ∆ Transitions occur from good 1 to good 2 or good 3 and from good 2 to good 3. Consumers who hold on to their initial good are represented by the dashed area. 8 INSERT Fig. 1 HERE   8 The set of consumers who hold on to good 1 coincide with the set of consumers who choose good 1 after the change since no shifts occur towards good 1.
In Figure 2 , we consider an income adjustment of z 1 , with ψ 1 ≤ z 1 < ψ 2 .
According to Lemma 1, only consumers choosing good 1 at situation 0 can be compensated with an amount less or equal to z 1 . The area to the East of S z 1 with boundaries ∆ z1 12 and ∆ z1 13 corresponds to the set C 1 (z 1 ) of consumers for whom an income adjustment less or equal to z 1 is required. 9 Since they stick to good 1, they already derive the same utility as before the change, i.e.
As noted above, this set coincides with B 1 (v * (z 1 )) and therefore,
In Figure 3 , we consider an income adjustment of z 2 , with ψ 2 ≤ z 2 ≤ ψ 3 .
According to Lemma 1, only consumers choosing good 1 or good 2 at situation 0 can be compensated with an amount less or equal to z 2 . The area to the East of S z 2 with boundaries ∆ z2 12 and ∆ z2 13 corresponds to the set C 1 (z 2 ) of consumers selecting good 1 at situation 0 for whom an income adjustment less or equal to z 2 is needed. This set coincides with
The area to the West of S z 2 with boundaries ∆ 23 corresponds to the set C 2 (z 2 ) of consumers selecting good 2 at situation 0 for whom an income adjustment less or equal to z 2 is needed. This set coincides with B 2 (v * (z 2 )) , and therefore C 2 (z 2 ) = B 2 (v * (z 2 )).
INSERT Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 HERE   9 The consumer located at S z 1 is exactly compensated with z 1 .
The main theorem
Denote by Φ i (.) the c.d.f. of the conditional CV, e cv i , (i.e. conditional on the choice of good i before the change). Then
where P 
Proof. According to Lemma 2, for z ∈
. Henceforth, computing the probability of C i (z) amounts to compute the probability of choosing good i with a vector of observed components of the utility given by v * (z). This leads to Eq. (14) .
Note that the unconditional CV, e cv, has a c.d.f. denoted by Φ (.), with Φ (z) =
Diversion on equivalent variation
Another usual welfare measure is the equivalent variation (EV). We use the
Assume the consumer selects i at situation 1; the conditional EV given the final choice of i, denoted by ev i (.), solves
while the unconditional EV, denoted by ev (.), verifies
Within this framework, we define ψ i (with slight abuse of notation) as the amount of income, which solves the equation
Assumption A3 is now replaced by:
Theorem 1 can be adapted directly to compute the distribution of the conditional EV, denoted by e ev i . We obtain:
Theorem 2 (Conditional distribution of EV) Assume A1, A2, A3' hold.
The survival function of the conditional equivalent variation e ev i on its support
where w * (z) the n-vector with kth component, k ∈ A, is given by:
Proof. Rewrite Eq. (15) as
This equation is analogous to Eq. (5), where the state indices are permuted, where −ev i (²) plays the role of cv i (²) and where −ψ i plays the role of ψ i .
Therefore, according to Lemma 1, ev i (²) exists, is unique and has support £ ψ − , ψ i ¤ . Now, since e ev i is continuous for z < ψ i and according to Theorem 1, the expression for
where w * (z) has components defined by (19). Finally, since S i (z) is continuous to the right and P i (w * (z)) ± P 1 i is continuous, we conclude that necessarily:
Note that the unconditional EV, denoted by e ev, has a survival function, denoted by S (.), with S (z) = P i∈A P 0 i S i (z), where S i (.) on its support
given by Eq. (18).
Moments of compensating variation
In this section, we compute the (un)conditional moments of the distribution of CV. Then, using expected CV, we extend Shephard's Lemma to the probabilistic demand systems and verify that with no income effects, see coincide with the traditional variation of surplus.
(Un)Conditional moments of CV
As a corollary of Theorem 1, we show that the conditional moments can be obtained up to a one dimensional integral of the choice probabilities:
Corollary 1 (Conditional moments of CV) Assume A1-A3 hold. The mth conditional moment of the compensating variation verifies:
Proof. For 0 ≤ π ≤ 1, define the conditional quantile function Φ
of CV. By definition, the mth conditional moment of CV is such that E [ e cv 
represents the (conditional) probability that the consumer selecting good i at situation 0 sticks to good i. The expected result (20) is obtained using an integration by parts.
Therefore, we obtain the following result for the unconditional moments:
Corollary 2 (Unconditional moments of CV) Assume A1-A3 hold. The mth unconditional moment of the compensating variation verifies:
Proof. Using the fact that Generally, the integrals which appear in Eq. (20) and (21) cannot be written in closed form, even for logit or GEV models. These integrals can be approximated analytically through simulation by generating (uniform) random draws 10 of z, calculating the probability P i (v * (z)) and then averaging the val-
Shephard's lemma
As a consequence of Eq. (21), expected CV is given by
This expression is reminiscent of the standard treatment of surplus, which involves the computation of areas under the compensated probability curves (The computation of expected consumer surplus was also envisaged by Small and Rosen [17] and by Karlstrom 11 [7] ). 10 Alternatively, the GEV sampler consists in draws of ² using Monte Carlo markov chain methods. The generated values cv m (²) are then averaged. As noted by McFadden [11] , this procedure is computationally burden. 11 Karlstom [7] research is focused on E [ e cv] while the distribution of e cv is derived in this paper. Moreover, he derives an integral expression for the first moment, where the integrand Let X i denote the aggregate (expected) demand for good i. The mass of consumers which are assumed to be statistically identical, is normalized to one.
The aggregate demand is:
, where x i is the conditional (individual) demand for good i. For a price variation ∆p i of good i, let ψ i (∆p i ) be the (constrained) CV associated to this price variation ∆p i (see Eq. (4)). In this case, we can use Shephard's Lemma which allows to recover the conditional
In Proposition 1, we show that the (aggregate) demand for good i can also be recovered from expected CV denoted by E [ e cv (∆p i )]. This result provides a version of Shephard's Lemma for an aggregate population of consumers buying according to a DCM. We have:
Proposition 1 (Shephard's Lemma revisited) Assume A1-A3 hold. If the indirect utility function V (.) is twice continuously differentiable in income and price, then:
Proof. Consider w.l.o.g. a change in price of good 1. To reduce notations, we omit below the argument ∆v 1 from ψ 1 and E [ e cv]. Moreover, since only variations in price are considered, we ignore the remaining arguments of χ i , and replace χ i by p i in our notations.
involves the partial derivative of the choice probabilities. By contrast, our expression given by Eq. ( 22) involves only choice probabilities.
First, for ∆p 1 > 0, Eq. (22) reduces to
and therefore:
From the following inequalities:
we get
Differentiability of J (z, ∆p 1 ) at z = 0 implies that there exists K > 0 such that 
Consumer's surplus
Consider the case where the marginal utility of income is constant and the same for all goods 12 (equal to 1, w.l.o.g). The Williams-Daly-Zachary Theorem states that with no income effects, the expected maximum utility is a representative or social utility function for a population of statistically identical consumers making discrete choices among the n goods (see McFadden [10] ). More precisely,
coincides with the conventional Marshallian consumer surplus. Applying Roy's Identity to CS (.) allows to recover the choice probabilities
For a change where v 0 and v 1 are the vectors of observed components of the utility before and after the change, respectively, the variation in consumer 12 Since utilities are defined up to a positive multiplicative constant.
surplus coincides with the area to the left of the choice probability curves
With unitary marginal utility of income, the unconditional CV solves (see
. In Proposition 2, we verify that the expression derived for expected CV (see Eq. (22)) coincides with the variation in consumer surplus:
Proposition 2 (Consumer's surplus) Assume A1-A3 hold. If the marginal utility of income is constant and the same for all goods, then:
where CS (.) is the aggregate consumer surplus.
Proof. Eq. (22) can be rewritten as
The Roy's identity (24) yields
Now, with no income effects, for k ∈ A,
which can be rewritten as
Note however that with income effect the expression
not represent an intuitive welfare measure (although it is sometimes used as such in empirical studies with income effects). With income effect, expected CV does provide a sound basis for welfare evaluations. 14 
Concluding remarks
We have proposed a formula which allow to compute the distribution of compensating variation for random utility models. The surprise is that an analytical formula exists and involves choice probabilities only. The formula can be written very simply for the GEV and the logit. The formula for the logit model is of particular interest since any system of choice probabilities can be written(under mild regularity conditions) as an integral of a logit model, (see McFadden and
Train [13] ) called a mixed logit model. Therefore, the computation of the compensation of a mixed logit can be greatly simplified since the individual com- 14 It can be shown that for concave in income indirect utility functions which are further assumed to be additively separable in income and the other arguments, we have:
pensation is straightforward. The issue will be explored in further empirical research.
as the set of goods for which a compensation is possible. According to A3,
, and by continuity of V (.) (see A1). Now, for k ∈ K i (²), define cv ik (²) as the unique solution of equation
Monotonicity of V (.) implies
Notice also that v 
Now, using Eq. (27) [cv ik (²)] .
Since cv ii (²) = ψ i and using (31), then cv i (²) ≥ ψ i . Moreover, from (30) we deduce cv i (²) ≤ ψ + . Therefore ψ i ≤ cv i (²) ≤ ψ + . Now, let k i (²) be the good chosen after the change (and after compensation), which is defined by (7) and is also such that: k i (²) = arg max k∈K i (²) [cv ik (²)].
According to A2, it is a.e. uniquely defined. Clearly k i (²) = i if cv i (²) = 
a contradiction. Therefore, we have proved that a.e.: k i (²) = k, k 6 = i ⇒ ψ i < cv i (²) < ψ k . Figure 1. -Choice events and transitions for a change. 
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